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Abstract
The calculus of relations is a rich discipline that spanned much of the history of
symbolic logic, with contributions ranging from De Morgan to Tarski. Yet not much
is known about the proof theory for the calculus of relations. For example, a sequent
calculus developed by Maddux has the shortcoming of not being cut-free. In this
work we will develop a sequent calculus that is cut-free. To do this we will use a
procedure developed by Negri & von Plato to transform geometric theories into rules
for a sequent calculus.






In the year 1900, David Hilbert published a list of twenty-three open problems in
mathematics. Several of them became very influential for the development of 20th
century mathematics, and some of them lack a definitive solution even today. Yet a
not very well known fact is that in the year 2000 a note by Hilbert was discovered,
mentioning a problem he never added to the list[1][2]:
As a 24th problem of my Paris talk I wanted to pose the problem: criteria
for the simplicity of proofs, or, to show that certain proofs are simpler
than any others. In general, to develop a theory of proof methods in
mathematics.
This note should elicit quite some interest, if not only to show the great insight that
Hilbert had, since the discipline of proof theory, which proved many results that
could be related to this 24th problem, would be born only 20 years after this note
was written.
At the beginning of the 20th century the mathematical community was starting
to develop the methods that we now consider to be central to the discipline of the
1
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foundations of mathematics. Many mathematical fields started to investigate how to
well-formulate some research questions related to the axioms of the field itself. For
example, even one of the most classical mathematical discipline, that of geometry,
had unresolved questions relative to the independence of one of its axioms (the
famous 5th postulate, dating back to Euclid).
And to answer such questions a systematic theory of how to obtain proofs from some
starting axioms was needed. It was from this and similar challenges that the idea
of a logical calculus gradually emerged. It was with the starting contributions from
Frege, Peano, and others, that the discipline of metamathematics evolved. And for
the first time it achieved to express mathematical statements purely with formulas,
totally manipulable in a precise syntactic fashion. This work was later perfected
by Russell in the first decade of the 20th century, thanks to him the principles of
proof found by Frege where expressed in the clearer notation of Peano. And thus
the seminal Principia Mathematica were born.
These formalizations played a central role in the research program outlined by
Hilbert’s 23 open problems. In particular, it was one of Hilbert’s aims to use such
formalization to show the consistency and completeness of arithmetic and analy-
sis. Thanks to the results of Gödel, we know that this research program of Hilbert
failed. The incompleteness theorems determined that it was impossible to obtain a
complete formalization for arithmetic, and that the consistency of Peano arithmetic
is unprovable.
This came at a great shock for the field, yet not all hopes of proving the consistency
of arithmetic went lost. This was due to the work of Gentzen, and the foundations
he gave to proof theory. Indeed one could claim that Gentzen’s work gave some
answers to Hilbert’s 24th problem we cited at the beginning, since he developed the
first successful theory about proof methods in mathematics.
First, through his work in natural deduction and sequent calculi systems, he pin-
pointed the subformula property as one of the key elements for the complexity and
decidability of a derivation. The basic idea being that a "good" proof system would
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have the property that its derivations only have formulas that are contained in the
conclusion to be derived. And so this property can be used to derive an upper-
bound on the number of formulas that can possibly appear in the derivation, and
thus inform questions regarding the complexity and decidability of a derivation.
In particular Gentzen proved that its sequent calculus of first order logic had this
property, though the famous result of cut-elimination (we will discuss this matter
in more detail later on in the chapter).
Secondly, Gentzen further developed proof theory to not only cover logic, but also
arithmetic. In his work he formalized Peano arithmetic derivations as proof trees
constructed from the rules of inference[3]. He defined a procedure to attach an
ordinal ≤ ε0 to a proof, and showed that, while moving down the tree, the ordinals
would get smaller. From this he deduced that if a contradiction was derivable, then
this would cause an infinite descending chain of ordinals.
By Gödel’s results we know that such a proof would not be provable in PA (indeed
Gentzen proved it in primitive recursive arithmetic plus quantifier free transfinite
induction up to ε0). So Gentzen’s proof would end up becoming the first "actual"
arithmetical statement not provable in PA (since Gödel’s famous "I am not provable"
formula needs the concept of provability from the metamathematics of a formalized
system), and it would become the foundation of the field of ordinal analysis.
These successes lead proof theory to further developments, in particular to find
proof systems for mathematical theories. For example, many continued Gentzen’s
and Hilbert’s aim of a proof theory of analysis. Furthermore many proof systems
have been developed for theories of order, lattice theory, and elementary geometry,
thanks to some recent developments in the sequent calculi of geometrical theories[4].
Yet one simple theory that lacked a syntactic characterization for a long time is the
theory of the calculus of relation. This theory has a history as long as logic itself,
given that it was first developed by De Morgan and Peirce, and then in the 1940s
Tarski developed it to what is now known as the theory of relation algebras, and
found many results of great mathematical importance. For example, one famous
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result is that relation algebras can express all first order logic containing no more
than 3 variables, and that this suffices to express PA. Thus relation algebras can be
seen as an alternative formalization of almost all mathematics.
Yet not much is known about the syntactical properties of such theory, given that
the only calculus in the literature[5] is provably not cut-free. Thus the aim of this
thesis will be to fill this gap in the literature, by finding a cut-free sequent calculus
for the calculus of relations.
To do so in the first chapter a broad introduction to the proof theory of sequent
calculi will be given. Then in the second chapter we will explain how to find sequent
calculi rules from any geometric theory, while preserving cut-elimination. The third
chapter presents how to obtain a geometric first-order theory out of any first order
theory. Finally the fourth chapter will apply the results from the previous chapters
to the calculus of relations.
More specifically for this chapter, we will give a broad introduction to the calculus of
sequents, and present some of the earliest results related to it. Given the availability
of resources on this subject[6][4], we will not give many details about the materials
presented. We will only try to give intuitions about the important features of sequent
calculi.
We will first give an introduction and the definition of a sequent calculus for propo-
sitional logic. Then we will present some of the biggest benefits of sequent calculi,
that is, their ease of use when searching for a proof, and which characteristics the
calculi have to maintain to preserve this ease of search. Next we present some
results (inversion, weakening, contraction) that are indispensable for proving later
results about sequent calculi. Lastly, we will expand our propositional calculus to a
first-order logic one, which we will be using for the rest of the thesis.
1.2 Introduction to sequent calculus
We fix an alphabet of propositional atoms {P,Q,R, ...}, countably infinite, further-
more we will have the logical constant ⊥. Then we define the propositional formulas
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{A,B,C, ...} inductively from the connectives ∨,∧,→, and ⊥.
We will call Γ ⇒ ∆ a sequent, where Γ and ∆ are finite multisets of propositional





we want to express that from everything in Γ follows at least something in ∆.
We will call Γ the antecedent, and ∆ the consequent. Then clearly if we have an
empty Γ, the sequent ⇒ ∆ expresses that
∨
∆ is a tautology. While if ∆ is empty,
then we have Γ → ⊥, so the antecedent Γ is inconsistent. As an example to get
the intuition behind sequent calculus, consider how we might prove the following
tautology: ⇒ (((p ∧ q)→ w) ∧ p)→ (q → w).
We start by looking at the meaning of the most external connective (→). So if
we assume ((p ∧ q) → w) ∧ p, then we should be able to derive q → w. For the
moment, we write this as ((p ∧ q) → w) ∧ p ⇒ q → w. Then we notice that at
this level we can deal with other 2 connectives (the ∧ and the →). So we start by
trying to get rid of ∧: if we are assuming ((p∧ q)→ w)∧ p, then then it’s the same
as assuming (p ∧ q) → w and p, thus we write (p ∧ q) → w, p ⇒ q → w. Then
we want to get rid of the → in q → w: we are assuming some formulas and we
want to prove q → w, so it is the same as assuming those formulas and q, to prove
w. Thus (p ∧ q) → w, p, q ⇒ w. We have another → to get rid of, but this time
is on our assumptions. So we use the equivalence A → B ≡ ¬A ∨ B. So we get
¬(p∧q)∨w, p, q ⇒ w. Now we have the connective ∨ in our assumptions, that means
we could reason by cases: we want w, p, q ⇒ w and ¬(p∧q), p, q ⇒ w. The first case
now has no more connectives, and we notice that we have a w in both the antecedent
and consequent, so is trivially true. What about ¬(p ∧ q), p, q ⇒ w? We have to
get rid of the negations, so we can notice, given our semantic interpretation, that∧
Γ∧¬A→
∨









So we have p, q ⇒ p ∧ q, w for the second case. The last connective is a ∧ in the
conclusion, so if we want to prove p∧ q, that is the same as proving first p and then
q, so this case is further split into p, q ⇒ p, w and p, q ⇒ q, w. In both cases we can
see that the have reached some tautologies.
The idea behind sequent calculus is that we want to imitate the kind of reasoning
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behind this example: we want to start with a sequent, and simplify the connectives
in the formulas in Γ and ∆ until all the connectives are eliminated and there are
only atomic formulas on each side of the sequent. So we want our proofs to look
like a rooted tree graph, with the root of the tree being the formula to be proven.
Then each step of the tree simplifies some connective, and sometimes branches the
tree. At the end we want to have only tautologies as the leaves of the tree. So we
need to give our inference rules, two for each connective, based whether they are on
the left or the right of the sequent. So for the ∧ we have:
Γ⇒ A,∆ Γ⇒ B,∆
R∧
Γ ⇒ A ∧B,∆
for the right and
Γ, A,B ⇒ ∆
L∧
Γ, A ∧B ⇒ ∆
for the left.
Given a rule, we call the formula whose connective is currently being eliminated the
principal formula (in the above case, A∧B). Furthermore we call the formula above






Γ, A⇒ ∆ Γ, B ⇒ ∆
L∨
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and left →
Γ⇒ A,∆ Γ, B ⇒ ∆
L→
Γ, A→ B ⇒ ∆
Then we need some axioms, our search for a proof will be successful only if at the
end of our proof tree search we find something that is obviously true. So our first
axiom represents the idea that a sequent is provable if one of the atoms on the right
correspond to an atom to the left:
Ax
Γ, P ⇒ P,∆
with P an atom.
Then we need a way to treat negation. We will use the equivalence ¬A ≡ A → ⊥,
and the rule (a sort of ex falso quodlibet) for ⊥:
⊥
Γ,⊥ ⇒ ∆
By inspecting all our rules, we can notice an important feature of our sequent cal-
culus, called the subformula property: in any proof-tree of a sequent Γ ⇒ ∆, the
formulas appearing above the inference line will be subformulas of the formulas in
Γ and ∆. This is an important observation that makes us conclude that the empty
sequent ⇒ is not derivable.
Furthermore all of our rules have an important property (easily seen with truth-
tables): whenever the premise of a rule is valid, then also the conclusion is valid.
This observation allows to immediately prove the soundness of the calculus: by
induction, the axioms we have given are clearly valid, and the rules preserve validity,
so clearly if we can prove a sequent with this calculus, then this sequent is valid.
On the other hand we can also see that completeness holds: if a sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ is
valid, then we will find a proof with our calculus. If we have a valid sequent, then
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it’s validity will be preserved upward. At the end our leaves can be axioms or a
general sequent Γ′ ⇒ ∆′ made by atoms (when the proof fails). Yet this last case
never happens, since the validity is preserved to the leaves, and having a general
sequent Γ′ ⇒ ∆′ on some leaf means that we could put all the atoms in Γ′ to true
and all the atoms in ∆′ to false, and thus have a not valid sequent. So we will never
find a regular sequent on the top level, and so our leaves will only be axioms. So we
will always have a proof.
Finally, if a sequent Γ⇒ ∆ is derivable in our sequent calculus, we write `n Γ⇒ ∆,
where n is the depth (the length of the longest branch) of the proof tree of Γ⇒ ∆.
This depth will be often used in induction proofs, like in the paragraph above.
This concludes our definition of the classical propositional logic sequent calculus,
which we will call G3cp[6]. The reason for the "3" is that this version of the calculus
was not historically the first one to be developed. We will give some motivations
about why this calculus is adopted in the next sections.
1.3 Desideratum: cut-free
In Gentzen’s original calculus, called LK, we had a rule of the following form:
Γ⇒ A,∆ Γ′, A⇒ ∆′
Cut
Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′
This rule can be seen as representing some sort of transitivity of the sequent: it
states that when we can conclude A, and this A can also be in the antecedent for
another derivation, then the A can be "cut", and the derivations joined.
We can notice that this rules appears to be very different from the rules of G3cp:
in our bottom-up proof construction, we could always know how to proceed using
the rules, which can be applied in a unique way. Yet if the cut rule is available then
we face a problem: how do we guess the formula A? (we notice that that formula
doesn’t appear in the below sequent Γ,Γ′∆,∆′). This creates some problems when
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it comes to automated theorem searches, as we no longer have a simple algorithm
as for the rules without cut.
Also another problem is that with a cut rule we are introducing a totally new formula
A in our proof tree, and this breaks the subformula property.
This motivates the importance of cut-elimination theorems. In case of G3cp+Cut,
we could do this easily given that we have the completeness and soundness theorems.
Theorem 1.3.1. If G3cp+Cut ` Γ⇒ ∆ then G3cp ` Γ⇒ ∆.
Proof. if G3cp+Cut ` Γ ⇒ ∆ then by soundness we know Γ ⇒ ∆ is valid (since
the cut rule is also sound), then by completeness G3cp ` Γ⇒ ∆.
Yet this proof does not give an algorithm that transforms an instance of a proof
containing cut, to a cut-free proof. This was first done by Gentzen in his "Main
Theorem" (Hauptsatz) about LK[7].
1.4 Desideratum: shared contexts
Another important property that our calculus contains is that, going upwards in the
proof tree search, it is always uniquely determined how to apply a rule. Consider
these two possible rules for the R∧ connective
Γ⇒ A ∆⇒ B R∧
Γ,∆ ⇒ A ∧B
and
Γ⇒ A Γ⇒ B R∧
Γ ⇒ A ∧B
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The first type of rule we call context independent, the second context sharing. They
can be seen to be equivalent (i.e. simulate the work of one using the other) in the
following way. If we have Γ ⇒ A ∧ B, then by contraction we have Γ,Γ ⇒ A ∧ B:
so we can use the context independent rule to get Γ ⇒ A and Γ ⇒ B ; if we have
Γ,∆ ⇒ A ∧ B, then by the context sharing we have Γ,∆ ⇒ A and Γ,∆ ⇒ B,
then by weakening we have Γ ⇒ A and ∆ ⇒ B). However we can easily see that
these two type of rules are not equivalent when it comes to proof-search algorithms.
We want the rules of the sequent calculus to be always used in a determined way,
but with the context independent rules, we would have to consider a lot of different
possibilities when it comes to splitting the context between the two antecedents of
the premises. With context sharing this doesn’t happen: a proof search is uniquely
determined by the principal formula of the sequent.
With this we conclude that the calculus G3cp is a good candidate for a sequent
calculus that has the subformula property and that has effective proof-search algo-
rithms.
1.5 Some initial theorems: inversion, weakening,
contraction
Now we can proceed to explain some of the first results related to sequent calculi.
Given the ample availability of textbooks related to these results[6][8], our exposition
will be rather short.
First we want to talk about how, when we inspect the rules of G3cp, we can no-
tice that not only the direction from premises to conclusions is valid, but also the
opposite. That is, we can prove that if we assume that the conclusion is derivable,
also the premise is derivable. Furthermore this result preserves proof depth. So, for
example, for the rule R→, we have that:
Theorem 1.5.1. If `n Γ⇒ A→ B,∆ then `n Γ, A⇒ B,∆
And we have a result of this shape, which we will call inversion principle, for each rule
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of G3cp. As in many other cases, all of these theorems can be proved by induction.
Another important result is weakening:
Theorem 1.5.2. If `n Γ⇒ ∆ then `n Γ, A⇒ ∆ and `n Γ⇒ A,∆
This result basically states that if we have proven a sequent, then we can weaken
the antecedent and/or the consequent, and we still have a valid sequent.
Lastly we present contraction:
Theorem 1.5.3. If `n Γ, A,A ⇒ ∆ then `n Γ, A ⇒ ∆. Also if `n Γ ⇒ ∆, A,A
then `n Γ⇒ ∆, A
This theorem states that when dealing with the multisets in a sequent, we can
disregard repetitions.
An important thing to note is that in all these results, the height of the proof `n
is preserved. This is important because it means that we can use these results
as useful lemmas while proving by induction on the depth of a proof. Indeed in
many textbooks[6][8] these results are used as important lemmas while proving cut-
elimination results.
1.6 The intuitionistic variant and the classical logic
variant
Now we extend our sequent calculus to first-order logic. We need a new first-order
language, with or without identity, and without function symbols except constants.
A term t of our language is either a variable x (we allow countably infinite many of
them) or a constant a. Then the formulas are defined inductively from the atoms
pni (t1, ...tn), with i ≥ 1 and n ≥ 0, and the propositional constant ⊥, and using the
connectives and the quantifiers (existential, ∃, and universal, ∀).
The substitution of a variable x with a term t in a term s (or in a formula A, or
in a multiset Γ) is written as s[t/x](or A[t/x], or Γ[t/x]). To indicate simultaneous
substitution of a list of variables x1, ..., xn with a list t1, ..., tn, we write [t̄/x̄].
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Now to complete the definitions of our first-order calculus: we will use the same














We also need that in the rules R∀ and L∃ the variable y does not occur free in the
conclusion. We will call y the eigenvariable of R∀ and L∃.
We will call this calculus G3c.
With the quantifier rules at our disposal we can obtain the intuitionistic variant
rather easily. We will call this intuitionistic variant of our calculus G3im. The
propositional part of it is equal to G3cp, except for the rules of implication[9]:
Γ, A→ B ⇒ A Γ, B ⇒ ∆
L→
Γ, A→ B ⇒ ∆
Γ, A⇒ B
R→
Γ, A→ B ⇒ ∆
The L→ rule has a repetition of the principal in the left premise. Furthermore the
succedent is only A. The right rule is similar in this. The existential quantifier will
be the same as in the classical calculus, while the universal quantifiers will be similar
to the implication:







With y an eigenvariable in R∀. These modifications might appear weird but are nec-
essary to make the weakening possible. We will not deal much with the intuitionistic
variant in this thesis, so we leave a more thorough description to [4].
Going back to G3c, an important lemma about substitutions of terms for variables
in a sequent is:
Lemma 1.6.1. If `n Γ⇒ ∆ then `n Γ[t/x]⇒ ∆[t/x], where t is freely substitutable
for x in ∆,Γ
which basically states that term renaming doesn’t impact our proof depth (again,
an important aspect for proofs by induction). Furthermore the previous result can
be strengthened even more, to substitute for a term instead that for a variable:
Lemma 1.6.2. If `n Γ ⇒ ∆ then `n Γ[t/u] ⇒ ∆[t/x], where the term t is freely
substitutable for the term u in ∆,Γ
With these results at our disposal we can prove the inversion, weakening, and con-
traction results also for G3c[8][6].
Finally a historically important result that we will only state is the cut elimination
theorem for G3c:
Theorem 1.6.3. If G3c+Cut ` Γ⇒ ∆ then G3c ` Γ⇒ ∆.
For a proof, the reader is redirected to [6].
With these definitions and results fixed for sequent calculi about logics, now we
are ready for the next chapter, where we will give a look at how we could devise a
sequent calculus for a mathematical theory.
Chapter 2
Extending the calculus
2.1 Extending the calculus
In the previous chapter we have seen how sequent calculus is an effective method for
finding proofs in first-order logic. Now we might ask ourselves: what about finding
proofs of a mathematical theory? Indeed first-order logic has a long history when it
comes to formalization of mathematics, but to do so it needs some axioms relative
to the mathematical theory that it wants to be speaking about. So it is spontaneous
to ask how the axioms of a theory can be added to the G3c sequent calculus, so that
it can derive the valid formulas of the theory.
One first idea might be to add the axioms of the theory as end sequents: if for
each axiom A of the theory we have a sequent rule of the form ⇒ A from which
the derivation can start, then our calculus should still be complete. Let’s see an
example of this.
We think about the theory of equivalence relations, and add two rules for a relation
R that is reflexive and Euclidean:
Ref⇒ xRx
Euc
xRz, yRz ⇒ xRy
14
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Now form these two rules we can derive that R is symmetric (yRx ⇒ xRy) by the
following derivation:
Ref⇒ xRx EucxRx, yRx⇒ xRy
Cut
yRx ⇒ xRy
Yet this proof uses a Cut rule. And clearly it wouldn’t be possible to derive yRx⇒
xRy without it. So if we want to preserve the cut-free property of G3c we have to
add the axioms of a theory in a different way.
Historically there have been different approaches to extend the rules of a sequent
calculus.
For example, Gentzen[10] tried to add some mathematical basic sequents, that is
substitution instances of sequents of the form P1, ..., Pi ⇒ Q1, ..., Qj, with P and Q
atomic formulas. Then one can prove that the cut rule can be eliminated also when
used with these basic sequents.
Another way of adding axioms, found in Gentzen’s consistency proof of elementary
arithmetic[7], is to put axioms as an antecedent Γ, such that to prove a theorem T
our sequent calculus would always prove results of the form Γ⇒ T . In this way the
sequent calculus derivations are basically the same as the G3c system, and so we
still have cut elimination. Yet we have to force such Γ set of mathematical axioms
even in derivations of logical rules, which might appear not natural.
Yet more recently[4] a fourth way of adding rules to the G3c sequent calculus was
developed, this will be the topic that we will explore in the rest of this chapter. The
aim of this approach will be to find some "good" rule only for a particular type of
mathematical theories, called geometric theories. Then in the next chapter we will
see how this approach can be extended to all theories.
2.2 Geometric axioms and rules
We start by defining geometric implications:
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Definition 2.2.1. Geometric implication: a geometric implication (sometimes called
special coherent implication) is a first-order sentence that is the universal closure of
an implication C → D, where C is a conjunction of atoms and D is a disjunction
of existentially quantified conjunctions of atoms.
That is geometric implications are formulas of the general form:
∀x̄(P1 ∧ ... ∧ Pn → ∃ȳ1M1 ∨ ... ∨ ∃ȳmMm)
With all the P̄ being atoms and each Mj being a conjunction of atoms Q̄. Further-
more we assume we rename the variables in P̄ s so that no ȳ appears free in P̄ . Also
we notice that in the geometric implication we can have an empty antecedent, by
swapping the conjunction with a single >, or an empty consequent, by swapping
the disjunction with a single ⊥. So for example the axiom for a reflexive relation R
becomes
∀x> → xRx
Finally a theory axiomatized by geometric implications will be called a geometric
theory.
We can find many examples of geometric theories[11], for example Robinson’s arith-
metic. Another example are all algebraic theories, like group theory and ring theory,
and all essentially algebraic theories, like category theory, the theory of fields, the
theory of local rings, lattice theory, projective geometry.
Furthermore it is interesting to notice that sometimes a theory that doesn’t im-
mediately appear as geometric can be easily transformed into one. For example,
Robinson arithmetic is a finitely axiomatized theory of first-order logic with iden-
tity. It’s axioms are[12]:
1. ¬s(a) = 0
2. s(a) = s(b)→ a = b
3. ¬a = 0→ ∃y s(y) = a
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4. a+ 0 = a
5. a+ s(b) = s(a+ b)
6. a · 0 = 0
7. a · s(b) = a · b+ a
We can notice that the third axiom is not in a geometric form, yet we can use the
equivalent a = 0 ∨ ∃y s(y) = a instead, and thus obtain a geometric theory.
So it would be useful to temporarily focus on theories axiomatized by such formulas,
as geometric implications have a shape that looks promising for being transformed
in a sequent calculi rule. Given a geometric implication G, such rule, called Grule
will be:
Q̄1(z̄1/ȳ1), P̄ ,Γ⇒ ∆ ... Q̄m(z̄m/ȳm), P̄ ,Γ⇒ ∆
Grule
P̄ ,Γ⇒ ∆
With the condition that the eigenvariables z̄i must not be free in P̄ ,Γ,∆. With this
condition, and by inspecting the rule, one can notice that we took care in a rather
simple way of the existential quantifiers.
Another aspect that might be puzzling at first is the presence of the repetition of
the P̄ in the premises. This is a trick that is necessary to be able to still have the
contraction lemma.
Suppose we have a derivation of A,A,Γ⇒ ∆, eith the last rule used being a Grule.
Then we have 3 different cases for the origin of that repeated A. First, both instances
of A are in Γ; second, one is principal; third, both of them are. In the first case
we would handle the contraction by a usual induction. But in the second case we
would have to use a trick used first to handle the contraction for the L → rule in
G3i[4], that is, putting a repeated principal formula in the premises. Also the third
case poses a problem, this time specific to the shape of geometric implications. The
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solution we will use is to add an ad hoc condition to have contraction, called the
closure condition:
Definition 2.2.2. Closure condition: a sequent calculus has the closure condition
if, for every rule of the type
Q̄1(z̄1/ȳ1), P1, ....Pm−2, P, P,Γ⇒ ∆ ... Q̄n(z̄n/ȳn), P1, ....Pm−2, P, P,Γ⇒ ∆
Grule
P1, ....Pm−2, P,Γ⇒ ∆
it has a rule
Q̄1(z̄1/ȳ1), P1, ....Pm−2, P,Γ⇒ ∆ ... Q̄n(z̄n/ȳn), P1, ....Pm−2, P,Γ⇒ ∆
Grule
P1, ....Pm−2, P,Γ⇒ ∆
Now clearly the number of rules to be added to a sequent calculus satisfying this
condition is bounded. So adding this fix is not problematic.
Now we have all the intuitions to understand the Grule. To further cement the
idea that this rule is able to convey the same expressiveness of the axiom it is
representing, we give the following theorem.
Theorem 2.2.1. A geometric axiom is derivable from the corresponding geometric
rule. Also, a geometric rule is derivable from the corresponding geometric axiom
plus the use of contraction, cut and inversion.
Proof. First we want to derive the sequent⇒ ∀x̄(P1∧...∧Pn → ∃ȳ1M1∨...∨∃ȳmMm):
Q̄1(z̄1/ȳ1), P̄ ,⇒M1(z̄1/ȳ1), ...,Mm(z̄n/ȳn)
R∃
Q̄1(z̄1/ȳ1), P̄ ,⇒ ∃ȳ1M1, ...,∃ȳmMm ...
Q̄m(z̄1/ȳ1), P̄ ,⇒M1(z̄1/ȳ1), ...,Mm(z̄n/ȳn)
R∃
Q̄m(z̄m/ȳm), P̄ ,⇒ ∃ȳ1M1, ...,∃ȳmMm
Grule
P̄ ⇒ ∃ȳ1M1, ...,∃ȳmMm repeated R∨
P̄ ⇒ ∃ȳ1M1 ∨ ... ∨ ∃ȳmMm repeated R∧
P1 ∧ ... ∧ Pn ⇒ ∃ȳ1M1 ∨ ... ∨ ∃ȳmMm
R→⇒ P1 ∧ ... ∧ Pn → ∃ȳ1M1 ∨ ... ∨ ∃ȳmMm
R∀⇒ ∀x̄(P1 ∧ ... ∧ Pn → ∃ȳ1M1 ∨ ... ∨ ∃ȳmMm)
For the second part of the theorem we want to check we can derive the Grule:
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Q̄1(z̄1/ȳ1), P̄ ,Γ⇒ ∆ ... Q̄m(z̄m/ȳm), P̄ ,Γ⇒ ∆
Grule
P̄ ,Γ⇒ ∆
Given that we also can use the geometric implication⇒ ∀x̄(P1∧ ...∧Pn → ∃ȳ1M1∨
...∨ ∃ȳmMm) as an axiom to the derivation. This can be checked by the derivation:
⇒ ∀x̄(P1 ∧ ... ∧ Pn → ∃ȳ1M1 ∨ ... ∨ ∃ȳmMm)
invR∀⇒ P1 ∧ ... ∧ Pn → ∃ȳ1M1 ∨ ... ∨ ∃ȳmMm
invR→
P1 ∧ ... ∧ Pn ⇒ ∃ȳ1M1 ∨ ... ∨ ∃ȳmMm
invL∧
P̄ ⇒ ∃ȳ1M1 ∨ ... ∨ ∃ȳmMm
Q̄1(z̄1/ȳ1), P̄ ,Γ⇒ ∆
L∧
M1(z̄1/ȳ1), P̄ ,Γ⇒ ∆
L∃∃ȳ1M1, P̄ ,Γ⇒ ∆ ...
Q̄m(z̄m/ȳm), P̄ ,Γ⇒ ∆
L∧
Mm(z̄m/ȳm), P̄ ,Γ⇒ ∆
L∃∃ȳmMm, P̄ ,Γ⇒ ∆
Grule∃ȳ1M1 ∨ ... ∨ ∃ȳmMm, P̄ ,Γ⇒ ∆
Cut
P̄ , P̄ ,Γ⇒ ∆
Contraction
P̄ ,Γ⇒ ∆
If we analyze the last derivation we can see that the Grule is actually hiding a cut.
This indeed creates a small problems for the desired subformula property. Yet as
we will see later we can still obtain a weaker version of the subformula property,
namely the subterm property. Another important remark is that it is convenient to
always assume that in a derivation the sets of free and bound variables are disjoint,
so we don’t have to face problems with the substituted variables yi.
Now that we have the definitions and rationale for the geometric rules, we can define
the sequent calculus that is formed by a geometric theory.
Definition 2.2.3. Given a Geometric theory T , G3cT is defined as the sequent
calculus obtained from G3c plus the Grules obtained from the axioms of T , plus the
rules that are necessary to satisfy the closure condition.
In the next section we will see how the sequent calculus thus defined holds the
desiderata (namely, cut elimination) that we explained in the previous chapter. But
as for the proof of G3c, before having the cut-elimination result we will have to
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prove that the inversion, weakening, substitution and contraction lemmas also hold
for G3cT.
2.3 Inversion, substitution, weakening, contraction
We first prove a new version of the substitution lemma.
Lemma 2.3.1. Substitution: if G3cT `n Γ ⇒ ∆ then G3cT `n Γ(t/x) ⇒ ∆(t/x),
with x a free variable in Γ and ∆, t a term free for x in Γ and ∆, and not containing
any of the variables of the geometric rules in the derivation.
Proof. Proof. By induction on the height of the derivation. The logical part of
the proof is already done. So we need to consider only the inductive step with the
last rule of the derivation being a Grule. So we have a P̄ ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆ Derived by the
premises Q̄1(z̄1/ȳ1), P̄ ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆, ..., Q̄m(z̄m/ȳm), P̄ ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆. We know that the term
t is free for x in these premises. So by induction hypothesis we get derivations of
Q̄1(z̄1/ȳ1)(t/x), P̄ (t/x) ,Γ′(t/x) ⇒ ∆(t/x), ..., Q̄m(z̄m/ȳm)(t/x), P̄ (t/x), Γ′(t/x) ⇒
∆(t/x). We are assuming that in a derivation the sets of free and bound variables are
disjoint, so we have x 6= yi. The zi are not free so x 6= zi. Also t does not contain any
of the yi. So we can swap the substitutions (z̄1/ȳ1) and (t/x): Q̄1(t/x)(z̄1/ȳ1), P̄ (t/x)
,Γ′(t/x) ⇒ ∆(t/x), ..., Q̄m(t/x)(z̄m/ȳm), P̄ (t/x), Γ′(t/x) ⇒ ∆(t/x). Then we apply
the geometric rule scheme to get P̄ (t/x),Γ′(t/x)⇒ ∆(t/x). So we are done.
By using this lemma we have the useful remark that in a derivation in G3cT, the
collections of proper variables of any two geometric rules can be considered as dis-
joint.
Now we can prove weakening.
Lemma 2.3.2. Weakening: If G3cT `n Γ⇒ ∆ then G3cT `n Γ, A⇒ ∆ and G3cT
`n Γ⇒ A,∆
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Proof. The proof is by induction, with the base case and almost all of the induction
step done with the classical result. We only consider the case where the last rule
that has been used is a geometric rule. We can use the induction hypothesis almost
immediately, except that it could be the case that A contains some variables used
in the geometric rule. At this point adding the A would cause problems with the
condition on eigenvariables not being free in P̄ ,Γ,∆. But we have the substitution
lemma, so we can apply it to prevent any variable clash. So we are done
By a quick observation, we can prove the inversion lemma.
Lemma 2.3.3. Inversion: if G3cT `n P̄ ,Γ ⇒ ∆ then G3cT `n Q̄1(z̄1/ȳ1), P̄ ,Γ ⇒
∆, ...Q̄m(z̄m/ȳm), P̄ ,Γ⇒ ∆
Proof. We simply notice that by a quick weakening we are done.
Finally we prove contraction.
Lemma 2.3.4. Contraction: If G3cT `n Γ, A,A ⇒ ∆ then G3cT `n Γ, A ⇒ ∆.
Also if G3cT `n Γ⇒ ∆, A,A then G3cT `n Γ⇒ ∆, A
Proof. We prove by induction. The classical cases are already proved, so we only
need to consider the inductive step with the last rule being used a geometric rule.
We consider both left and right contraction. We have to consider different cases.
We could have that both occurrences of A are not principal in the rule. In this case
we can apply directly the induction hypothesis and then the rule and be done. The
other case is when only one occurrence of A is principal. In this case A is one of the
atoms P , so we handle this by repeating the principal formulas P in the geometric
rule. The third and final case is when both occurrences of A are principal. This is
the case why we introduced the closure condition, so we are done.
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Now that we have these lemmas we are ready to prove the cut elimination theorem
for the sequent calculi of geometric theories.
2.4 Cut elimination
Theorem 2.4.1. If G3cT+Cut ` Γ⇒ ∆ then G3cT ` Γ⇒ ∆.
Proof. This proof will have the same structure as usual proofs of cut elimination[6].
We assume we have a rule of the form
Γ⇒ A,∆ Γ′, A⇒ ∆′
Cut
Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′
used somewhere in our sequent calculus derivation, and we show by induction how
to eliminate it. The induction is on the length of A, with an auxiliary induction on
the sums of the derivations heights of the two premises of the cut rule (hl for left
height, hr for right height). For hl + hl = 0 the theorem follows the usual proof
of cut elimination. So we only consider the cases where the height of the cut is
hl + hl > 0, and that arise from the addition of the geometric rule. So we have 2
sub-cases, depending on the length of A.
• Length of A is 0. Then we have two further cases whether we consider the left
premise of the cut or the right one. Considering the left, then A is some atom P
(other than in P̄ ). So we have a derivation of the form:
Q̄1(z̄1/ȳ1), P̄ ,Γ⇒ ∆, P ... Q̄m(z̄m/ȳm), P̄ ,Γ⇒ ∆, P
Grule
P̄ ,Γ⇒ ∆, P Γ′, P ⇒ ∆′
Cut
P̄ ,Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′
In which case the first thing we notice is that we can always use the substitution
lemma, so we can consider the variables zi as fresh. So we can push the cut up in
the derivation, without problems (this will be the general strategy also in the rest
of the proof, we want to push the cut one step up in the derivation, so that we can
apply the IH):
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Q̄1(z̄1/ȳ1), P̄ ,Γ⇒ ∆, P Γ′, P ⇒ ∆′
Cut
Q̄1(z̄1/ȳ1), P̄ ,Γ,Γ
′ ⇒ ∆,∆′ ...





P̄ ,Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′
Now we consider P being in the right premise. In this case P could be either not
principal, so we proceed like above and we are done, or principal (Say P1 in P̄ ), in
which case we have:
Γ⇒ ∆, P1
Q̄1(z̄1/ȳ1), P1, ...Pn,Γ







So we have to look at the left premise now, to know how to eliminate/push up
the cut. if Γand ∆ have one atom in common, then we have this situation also in
P2, ...Pn,Γ,Γ
′∆,∆′, so we are done. If ⊥ is in Γ, or > is in ∆, then the same happens
in the conclusion of the cut, so also in this case we are done immediately. If P1 is in
Γ, then the conclusion is of the form P1, P2, ...Pn,Γ′′,Γ′∆,∆′, and is obtained from
P1, ...Pn,Γ
′ ⇒ ∆′ by weakening.
So we only have to take care of the cases, for each rule, where the left premise is from
some rule, and without P1 being principal. To do these we use the usual lemmas,
and are straightforward. As examples we give the ones for L∃, L→, and Grule.
For L∃ we have a derivation of the form:
Γ, A[t/x]⇒ ∆, P1 L∃
Γ, ∃xA⇒ ∆, P1
Q̄1(z̄1/ȳ1), P1, ...Pn,Γ




Cut∃xA, P2, ...Pn,Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′
This is dealt first by noticing we can substitute fresh variables in our geometric rule
to not have eigenvariables problems, then with:
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Γ, A[t/x]⇒ ∆, P1 P1, ...Pn,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′ Cut
A[t/x], P2, ...Pn,Γ,Γ
′ ⇒ ∆,∆′
L∃∃xA, P2, ...Pn,Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′
For L→ we have a derivation of the form:
Γ⇒ A,∆, P1 Γ, B ⇒ ∆, P1 L→
Γ, A→ B ⇒ ∆, P1
Q̄1(z̄1/ȳ1), P1, ...Pn,Γ





A→ B,P2, ...Pn,Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′
But we deal with this by:
Γ⇒ ∆, P1 P1, ...Pn,Γ′ ⇒ A,∆′ Cut
P2, ...Pn,Γ,Γ
′ ⇒ A,∆,∆′
Γ, B ⇒ ∆, P1 P1, ...Pn,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′ Cut
P2, ...Pn,Γ,Γ
′, B ⇒ ∆,∆′
L→
A→ B,P2, ...Pn,Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′

























After pondering how we don’t have variable clashes by using the substitution lemma,
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With all the m premises derived from a cut on P1, ...Pn,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′ (which we get from
a Grule we have) and a Q̄′x(z̄′1/ȳ′1), P ′1, ...P ′n,Γ⇒ ∆, P1. Then by IH we are done.
• Now we have the cases where the cut is applied to a formula A that is not an
atom. We again have to distinguish the cases where we are looking at the right or
left premise.
For the left, almost all the cases are done by the classical cut-elimination proof, we
only need to focus on the case where the left rule is derived from a Grule:
Q̄1(z̄1/ȳ1), P̄ ,Γ⇒ ∆, P ... Q̄m(z̄m/ȳm), P̄ ,Γ⇒ ∆, P
Grule
P̄ ,Γ⇒ ∆, P Γ′, P ⇒ ∆′
Cut
P̄ ,Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′
But we already dealt with this case, the fact that A is a formula doesn’t matter
much.
For the right, the fact that A is a formula makes it so that it must be from Γ′ (not
principal). So we have the case:
Γ⇒ ∆, A
Q̄1(z̄1/ȳ1), P1, ...Pn, A,Γ







Which is dealt with:
Q̄1(z̄1/ȳ1), P1, ...Pn,Γ,Γ




With each of them premises obtained with a cut from Γ⇒ ∆, A and Q̄x(z̄x/ȳx), P1, ...Pn, A,Γ′ ⇒
∆′. So we are done.
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This result is useful because it gives us directly the weak subformula property
Theorem 2.4.2. If G3cT ` Γ⇒ ∆, then in the derivation appear only subformulas
of Γ,∆, or atomic formulas.
Which is a stepping stone in proving the subterm property for the rules of a calcu-
lus. This in turn is of great interest because with the subterm property we get an
immediate solution to the derivability problem of a sequent.
This on ultimate analysis depends on the atomic formulas coming from the geometric
rule, as it might be that they are introduced in such a way that we cannot track
them, making a calculus undecidable. Yet this strategy might still be useful, as it
pinpoints the origin of the undecidability, and it can be used to give some subset of
a theory which could be decidable (we will see a simple example of this in chapter
4).
Meanwhile in the next section we are going to show an important consequence of
having a calculus for geometric theories.
2.5 Barr’s theorem
In this section we present a general and interesting application of the ability to get
a sequent calculus out of any geometric theory.
First we notice without proof that the results of this chapter could have been very
well presented with the intuitionistic counterpart of G3c, that is, G3im (the inter-
ested reader is redirected to [11] for more information). Indeed it can be shown that
the results for the cut-elimination theorem hold for both systems, without many
differences in the proofs presented above. So we call the intuitionistic variant en-
hanced with geometric rules G3imT(where the "m" stands for multisuccedent). We
only remind that the main difference between the two calculi is that the principal
formula of rule L → is repeated in the antecedent of the left premise. Also in the
rule R → and R∀, there is no ∆ in the consequent of the premise. As we expect,
2.5. Barr’s theorem 27
these differences make so that the formulas provable with G3cT and G3imT are
different. Yet geometric theories present us with an interesting observation:
Theorem 2.5.1. Barr’s theorem: Let T be a geometric theory, and let A be a
geometric formula. Then if G3cT `⇒ A, then G3imT `⇒ A.
Proof. A is of the form ∀x(B → C). This tells us that in a G3cT proof of such a
formula, we first have a R∀ step/steps, then a R→ step, and then any combination
of rules to derive C and B: for which we will only use the ∧,∨,∃ and geometric
rules. This is because A is geometric, so B and C do not contain any → or ∀.
We also notice that a geometric rule has the same consequent in the premises and
conclusions, so they will preserve the sequents that have a single consequent. So we
are sure that in the G3cT derivation, the R∀ and R→ derivations are applied to a
single consequent. So the intuitionistic rules are applicable. So G3imT `⇒ A.
This is an interesting result originally coming from a different field. Indeed the study
of geometric theories has influenced many areas of logic and mathematics. And one
such example is in topos theory, where Barr’s theorem is a classical result.
Thus we end the chapter by noticing how this classical theorem becomes almost
immediately provable through the methods of proof theory, by a simple analysis of
the rules used by a calculus. This testifies for the strength of this approach.





The aim of this chapter will be to prove how to obtain a sequent calculus from non-
geometric theories. In the last chapter we obtained a procedure to obtain sequent
calculi rules for geometric theories. Now we will give a method to get a geometric
conservative extension out of every first-order theory, so that we can use the result
from the past chapter to get a sequent calculus out of any theory.
This method can be considered a modification of Skolem’s "normal form" theorem
from 1920[13][14]. Skolem showed that for any first-order sentence is possible to
construct a ∀∃ sentence that is satisfiable iff the initial sentence is satisfiable. This
was done by the familiar procedure of extending the original language with new
predicate symbols.
Although this result is very similar to what we need, in Skolem’s paper geometric
axioms are not treated. As reported in[13] the first to publish a similar result for
geometric axioms was Antonius[15], that showed in 1975 that given any first order
theory, one can always translate it to a geometric theory provided that we can add
sufficiently many new relational symbols. Yet this result is due to a completeness
theorem proved through category-theoretic models, so in this chapter we will follow
the results of Dyckhoff and Negri[13], that extended the results of Antonius and
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relate it to the work of Skolem.
So the aim of this chapter will be to augment Skolem’s proof by showing that given
a first-order sentence A in a language L we can construct an extension of L′ of L
and a finite set of geometric formulas that have the same consequences as A (that
is a geometric conservative extension). To do so we will first give some starting
definitions about formulas, theories, and extensions.
3.2 Starting definitions
To begin it is useful to recall the definition of geometric formula from the past
chapter. Yet it will be more useful if we distinguish a geometric formal and its
component part, that is a positive formula.
Definition 3.2.1. Positive formula: a positive formula is a first-order logic formula
composed only of atoms, conjunction, disjunction, and existential quantification.
Starting from this definition we give a more useful one:
Definition 3.2.2. Special positive formula: a special positive formula is a disjunc-
tion of existentially quantified conjunctions of atoms.
Given these two definitions it is immediate to notice that we can use the distribution
rules over the conjunctions and disjunction, to obtain a special positive formula out
of every positive formula.
Now we can give a more general definition of geometric implication:
Definition 3.2.3. Geometric implication: a geometric implication is a universal
closure of an implication A→ B, where each A, B, are positive formulas.
this more general definition will help to make clarity in later proofs, now we give the
definition we where using in chapter 2 (we will later prove that these 2 definitions
are almost equivalent).
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Definition 3.2.4. Special geometric implication: a special geometric implication is
the universal closure of an implication A → B, where A is a conjunction of atoms
and B is a special positive formula.
This is the definition we where used to, and we can prove the following:
Theorem 3.2.1. Every geometric implication is equivalent to a conjunction of spe-
cial geometric implications.
Proof. We pick a geometric implication, it will have the form A → B. We can
transform B into a special positive formula. Then for A we use the equivalence
(∀x(P ∨Q)→ S) ≡ ((∀xP → S) ∧ (∀xQ→ S)) to eliminate the disjunctions. And
∀x(∃yP → Q) ≡ ∀xy(P → Q) to eliminate the existential quantifiers. So we are
done.
This is useful because of the following definition:
Definition 3.2.5. Geometric theory: a theory is geometric if it is axiomatized by
geometric implications.
So without loss of generality we can consider a geometric theory to be axiomatized
by special geometric implications.
Now we give some (more famous) definitions.
Definition 3.2.6. Conservative extension: a theory T in a language L is extended
by a theory T ′ in a language L′ if L′ is extending L and if for every formula φ ∈ L,
we have that T ` φ iff T ′ ` φ.
Definition 3.2.7. L-equivalence: two formulae (or theories) are said to be L-
equivalent when they prove the same L-formulae.
Given these definitions we can present our principal result as: any first-order L-
theory T is L-equivalent to a geometric theory.
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To finish we will quickly recall the standard notions of definitional extension of a
theory. The idea is that we can add new predicate symbols to the language, by also
adding new axioms to the theory to specify their meaning.
Definition 3.2.8. Definitional equivalence: Given L a language and P a new
predicate symbol not in the language, a definitional equivalence are the sentences
∀xP (x)→M(x) and ∀xM(x)→ P (x), with M an L-formula.
this next definition will be the basic "step" necessary to build a definitional exten-
sion.
Definition 3.2.9. Immediate definitional extension: Given a theory T in the lan-
guage L, and immediate definitional extension of T is given by the addition of a new
predicate symbol P to L and a definitional equivalence of P to T as an axiom.
We notice that after an immediate definitional extension of a theory T by a predicate
P that has definitional equivalence with an original predicate M , we might modify
the original axioms in T by replacing the M with the P .
Definition 3.2.10. Definitional extension: Given a theory T in the language L, a
definitional extension of T is the multiple application of an immediate definitional
extension (we allow the predicate symbols added early to be modified in later steps)
We can modify these definitions to something weaker but more useful to us, that is,
semidefinitional extensions. That is the same idea expressed in the previous defini-
tions, but with only one direction of the implication of the definitional equivalence.
But before doing that the following well known definition will be useful:
Definition 3.2.11. Positive/Negative occurrence in a formula. Given a formula F :
1. F is a positive occurrence of F
2. If A∨B is a positive(negative) occurrence in F , then both A and B are positive
(negative) occurrences in F
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3. If A∧B is a positive(negative) occurrence in F , then both A and B are positive
(negative) occurrences in F
4. if A → B is a positive(negative) occurrence in F , then both A is a nega-
tive(positive) occurrence and B is a positive (negative) occurrence in F .
With this we can define the following:
Definition 3.2.12. Positive semidefinitional extension: Given a theory T and a
formula ∀xP (x) → M(x), we obtain a positive semidefinitional extension of T by
replacing any positive occurrence ofM(x) by P (x) in the axioms of T , and by adding
∀xP (x)→M(x) to the axioms.
Definition 3.2.13. Negative semidefinitional extension: Given a theory T and a
formula ∀xM(x) → P (x), we obtain a negative semidefinitional extension of T by
replacing any negative occurrence ofM(x) by P (x) in the axioms of T , and by adding
∀xM(x)→ P (x) to the axioms.
Definition 3.2.14. Immediate semidefinitional extension: Given a theory T in the
language L, and immediate semidefinitional extension of T is given by the addition
of a new predicate symbol P to L and the extension of T by either a negative or
positive semidefinitional extension.
Definition 3.2.15. Semidefinitional extension. Given a theory T in the language
L, a semidefinitional extension of T is the multiple application of non-interacting
immediate semidefinitional extension or immediate definitional extensions.
In this last definitions we are including immediate definitional steps as well for the
cases where we want to abbreviate both a positive and negative M . Yet we cannot
do this with two semidefinitional extensions because after the first our P would no
longer be fresh.
One immediate result that follows immediately from the definitions and is important
to notice is
Lemma 3.2.2. Every definitional extension is a semidefinitional extension.
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Now we are ready to present the result of Skolem.
3.3 Skolem’s result
We start with an important definition of Skolem extension.
Definition 3.3.1. Skolem extension: Given a language L and a theory T in it, a
theory T ′ in a language L′ extending L is a Skolem extension when
1) every theorem of T is a theorem of T ′
2) there is a substitution of L-formulae for predicate symbols in L′ \ L s.t. every
theorem of T ′ is a theorem of T .
With this we prove the following useful theorem.
Theorem 3.3.1. 1) Every semidefinitional extension is a Skolem extension
2) Every Skolem extension is a conservative extension
3) If T ′ is a Skolem extension of T , then they are both satisfiable in the same do-
mains, with L being interpreted the same way.
Proof. 1) By definition we can pick an immediate semidefinitional extension. It will
be either positive or negative.
If it is positive then we have an axiom ∀xP (x) → M(x) added to T and a new
predicate P added to L. Then pick an axiom A of T with some positive occurrences
of M(x), these will be replaced by P (x) in the new axiom A′ of T ’. Since these
occurrences are positive with the new axiom ∀xP (x) → M(x) we can infer that
A′ → A. So A is a theorem of T ′. This reasoning works similarly for the negative
immediate semidefinitional extension. So the first part of the definition of Skolem
extension is done.
The second part is also immediate because swapping any occurrence of P (x) with
M(x) will get us back to the original theorems or with the tautology ∀xM(x) →
M(x). So we are done.
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2) This is immediate because by the second part of the definition of Skolem extension
we have a substitution that preserves L-formulae.
3)We have a T ′ satisfiable in D, we want to prove that T is satisfiable in D as well,
but then by the first point of the definition of Skolem extension we are immediately
done. Conversely we have a theory T in a domain D with an interpretation I, and
we want it’s Skolem extension T ′ to be satisfied in D. We can do this because by
the second point of the definition of Skolem extension we have a substitution σ that
substitutes predicate symbols in L′ \ L with L-formulae s.t. every theorem of T ′ is
a theorem of T . Then we can define a new interpretation I ′ s.t I ′(A) = I(Aσ) if A
is a predicate symbol in L′ \ L, otherwise we set it equal to I. Then we have that
everything in T is satisfied in D. So we are done.
Now we will give a quick example of how to employ Skolem extensions, before
extending it to geometric theories.
3.4 Example
Suppose we have the following formula:
∀x∃y∀zU(x, y, z)
Then we might want to get rid of the last quantifier, by substituting ∀zU(x, y, z)
with an single predicate R(x, y), so to obtain the formula ∀x∃yR(x, y). Intuitively
we want a formula expressing that ∀x, y(R(x, y) ≡ ∀zU(x, y, z)). To do so we use the
definitional equivalence definition from the past sections, that gives us the formulae:
∀x, y (R(x, y)→ ∀zU(x, y, z))
and
∀x, y (∀zU(x, y, z)→ R(x, y))
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which become:
∀x, y, z (R(x, y)→ U(x, y, z))
and
∀x, y ∃z (U(x, y, z)→ R(x, y))
From here it’s clear that with this formulae and ∀x∃yR(x, y) we can prove the initial
formula ∀x∃y∀zU(x, y, z). More than that, only the formula
∀x, y, z (R(x, y)→ U(x, y, z))
and ∀x∃yR(x, y) suffice to prove ∀x∃y∀zU(x, y, z), which is the result we desire
given that we want geometric axioms for our theories. So now we will argue more
formally how to obtain such result.
3.5 An extension of Skolem’s extensions
Our first aim will be to consider a generic ∀∃ formula and prove that it can be re-
placed by special geometric implications. So we consider a generic formula ∀x∃yM1(x, y)∨
... ∨Mn(x, y), with each Mj being a conjunction of literals. So each Mj will have
the generic form Pj1(x, y) ∨ ... ∨ Pjr(x, y) ∨ ¬Qj1(x, y) ∨ ... ∨ ¬Qjs(x, y). Then
we replace each of the s formulas ¬Q with a new predicate N , so to obtain a
new formula ∀x∃yM ′1(x, y) ∨ ... ∨ M ′n(x, y) , with each M ′ being a conjunction
of only positive atoms. After distribution of the quantifier this formula becomes
∀x(∃ yM ′1(x, y) ∨ ... ∨ ∃y M ′n(x, y)), which is equivalent to
∀x> → (∃ yM ′1(x, y) ∨ ... ∨ ∃y M ′n(x, y))
that is, a special geometric implication.
Likewise we have to add an axiom for each literal Q that was substituted. These
axioms will be of the form ∀x, y Nji(x, y)→ ¬Qji(x, y), which is
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∀x, y (Nji(x, y) ∧Qji(x, y))→ ⊥
again a special geometric implication.
Given these observations we are ready to prove the following
Theorem 3.5.1. Every ∀∃ theory has a Skolem extension axiomatized by special
geometric implications
Proof. We first need to notice that the formulae ∀x, yNji(x, y)→ ¬Qji(x, y) together
with ∀x(∃ yM ′1(x, y) ∨ ... ∨ ∃y M ′n(x, y)) imply the original formula ∀x∃yM1(x, y) ∨
... ∨Mn(x, y).
Conversely we also need to show that anything that is provable from the formu-
lae ∀x, y Nji(x, y) → ¬Qji(x, y) together with ∀x(∃ yM ′1(x, y) ∨ ... ∨ ∃y M ′n(x, y)),
and that doesn’t use the new predicate symbols, is also provable from the original
∀x∃yM1(x, y) ∨ ... ∨Mn(x, y), but we get this from the previous result that every
semidefinitional extension is a Skolem extension. So we are done.
With this result in our hands we now only have to prove that we can replace any
theory with a ∀∃ theory. The intuition here is that if we have a formula of the form
∀x∃y∀z∃u U(x, y, z, u)
Then we can transform it to a ∀∃ formula by using the "definitional" axiom ∀x, yP (x, y)→
∀z∃u U(x, y, z, u), i.e. ∀x, y, z P (x, y) → ∃u U(x, y, z, u), and our old sentence be-
comes
∀x∃y P (x, y)
that is, a ∀∃ formula.
So we have to prove that this works for a finite number of quantifier alternations.
In this way we will have the following theorem.
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Theorem 3.5.2. Given A be any first-order sentence, we can construct a finite set
special geometric implication that are axioms of a Skolem extension of the theory
axiomatised by A.
Proof. We pick a generic formula A. We can consider it as being of the form:
∀x1∃y1∀x2∃y2....∀xn∃yn B(x1, x2, ...xn, y1, y2, yn)
With B being in disjunctive normal form. Then we can start the process of replacing
it with the formulae
∀x1∃y1 P1(x1, y1)
and
∀x1, x2, y1 (P1(x1, y1)→ ∃y2,∀x3,∃y3...∀xn∃yn B(x1, x2, ...xn, y1, y2, ...yn))
In this last formula the subformula ∃y2...∀xn∃yn B(x1, x2, ...xn, y1, y2, ...yn)) is not
yet of the form we want, so we consider another "definition" axiom
∀x1, x2, y1, y2 (P2(x1, x2, y1, y2)→ ∀x3,∃y3...∀xn∃yn B(x1, x2, ...xn, y1, y2, ...yn))
And so our formula ∀x1, x2, y1(P1(x1, y1)→ ∃y2,∀x3,∃y3...∀xn∃ynB(x1, x2, ...xn, y1, y2, ...yn))
can be simplified to a special geometric implication:
∀x1, x2, y1 (P1(x1, y1)→ ∃y2 P2(x1, x2, y1, y2))
But now the formula ∀x1, x2, y1, y2(P2(x1, x2, y1, y2)→ ∀x3,∃y3...∀xn∃ynB(x1, x2, ...xn, y1, y2, ...yn))
is still not done yet, we need the addition of another formula of the form
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∀x1, x2, x3, y1, y2 (P2(x1, x2, y1, y2)→ ∃y3 P3(x1, x2, x3, y1, y2, y3))
and for that it will need a definition of the form :
∀x1, x2, x3, y1, y2, y3(P3(x1, x2, x3, y1, y2, y3)→ ∀x4,∃y4...∀xn∃ynB(x1, x2, ...xn, y1, y2, ...yn))
which will lead us to another series of implications.
From this it follows that a series of axioms of the following form will be created:
∀x1∃y1 P1(x1, y1)
∀x1, x2, y1 (P1(x1, y1)→ ∃y2 P2(x1, x2, y1, y2))
∀x1, x2, x3, y1, y2 (P2(x1, x2, y1, y2)→ ∃y3 P3(x1, x2, x3, y1, y2, y3))
...
∀x1, ...xi+1, y1, ...yi (Pi(x1, ...xi, y1, ..yi)→ ∃yi+1 Pi+1(x1, ...xi+1, y1...yi+1))
until we reach the final
∀x1, ...xn, y1, ...yn−1 (Pn−1(x1, ...xn−1, y1, ..yn−1)→ ∃yn B(x1, x2, ...xn, y1, y2, ...yn))
Now that we have a procedure to generate e finite list of ∀∃ axioms, we can use the
result of theorem 5.1, to obtain a Skolem extension axiomatized by special geometric
implications.
With this result and with theorem 3.1 we get the immediate result that we want
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Theorem 3.5.3. For every first-order theory T , we can construct a theory T ′ that
is a geometric conservative extension of T .
Given this we can conclude that we are able to use the results from chapter 2 on
any theory. That is, we can get a cut-free calculus out of any first order theory, by
first transforming it into a geometric theory.
Chapter 4
Relation Algebra and Sequent
Calculi
In this chapter we will see how to utilize the techniques that we learned in the
previous chapters. In particular we will find a cut-free calculus for the theory of
relation algebras.
4.1 Historical remarks
In 1864, after the pioneering work of George Boole [16], Augustus de Morgan writes
the first paper on the subject of the logic of relations. De Morgan realized that the
logic of that time was inadequate to express some types of arguments, even some
trivial ones. As he famously noted, the logic of Aristotle was not able to deduce,
from the fact that a horse is an animal, that the head of a horse is the head of an
animal. In his efforts to expand the limits of traditional logic, he was the first to
try to use the concept of relations, and to recognize its significance.
Later Charles Saunders Peirce would give a foundation to the theory of relations in
1883[17], by making precise all the fundamental concepts of the theory of relations
and formulating its fundamental laws. In this work he would also discuss the opera-
tion of relational composition, and give one of the first intuitions about the need of
40
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a notion of quantifier distinct from the classical boolean connectives[18]. In doing
this, he made clear that a part of the theory theory of relations can be presented
as a calculus, formally similar to the calculus of classes developed by G. Boole, but
with greater expressive power.
An extension of the work of Peirce on the calculus of relations was then accomplished
by Ernst Schröder[19], and with this work the theory seemed to be interesting and
rich enough to become a field of study per se. For example, the initial paper[20][21]
by Leopold Löwenheim (where a version of the downward Löwenheim-Skolem theo-
rem was first proved) was written based on the calculus of relations. Furthermore
Whitehead and Russel, in the Principia Mathematica, included the theory of rela-
tions as one of the core parts of symbolic logic. They would write [22]:
"The subject of symbolic logic is formed by three parts: the calculus of
propositions, the calculus of classes, and the calculus of relations"
Yet the calculus of relations soon experienced a setback, when Alwin Korselt proved
the existence of some formulae in which four deep nested quantifiers had no equiv-
alent in the calculus of relations[23].
This led to a loss of interest in the field until the work of Tarski. In 1941 he published
the paper "On the calculus of relations"[24] in which he formulated the calculus as
a finitely axiomatized FOL theory. In this paper Tarski notes also how this system
might be better expressed by using an equational formulation, that is by developing
a calculus that only deals with relations and doesn’t need to delve into FOL. This
created the field of relation algebra. Throughout the years various results succeeded
in showing the expressive power of such system, with one of the most famous results
due to Tarki[25], establishing that a relation algebra can express any FOL formula
with at maximum three variables. Then it is provable that this fragment of FOL is
sufficient to express Peano arithmetic, and this entails that relation algebras can be
used to effectively algebrize almost all of mathematics, without the cost that comes
with quantifiers and connectives from FOL. Because of these reasons we choose
relation algebras as an interesting theory to be explored with a sequent calculus.
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4.1.1 Relation algebra
We start by giving a quick presentation of the current formalization of a relation
algebra. We do this just to give an understanding of the calculus under the most
current mathematical framework, as later we will construct our sequent calculus
starting from the original formalization of Tarski, given in FOL.
A Relation Algebra(RA) is a structure A = 〈A,+,−,,`, 1̊〉 of type 〈2, 1, 2, 1, 0〉.
The intuitive meaning of A is that of a set of binary relations. + is the absolute
or Boolean addition of relations, that is if xRy is "x loves y" and xPy is "x hates
y", then xR + Py is "x loves or hates y". − is the complementation, so if R is the
relation of "loving", then R− is the relations of "not loving".  is the relative or
Peircean multiplication, so if R is the relation of "behaving kindly" and P is the
relation of "being a friend of" then R P is "behaving kindly with a friend of". `
the formation of converses, so if R is "loving" then R` is "being loved". And 1̊ the
identity element or Peircean unit, with the meaning of "is the same as". (for a more
intuitive meaning, we will present the FOL description of the Relation operation
symbols after presenting the conditions of a RA). We notice that RA does not use
individual variables x, y, ... to specify the relations, the algebra has as elements only
the binary relations.
There are more operations in the classical calculus of relations, but they can be all
described in terms of these fundamental operations. So, given R,P ∈ A we have
that:
• The absolute or Boolean multiplication R · P is (R− + P−)− (if R is "loving"
and P is "hating", then R · P is "loving and hating").
• The relative or Peircean addition R⊕P is (R−P−)− (if R is the relation of
"behaving kindly" and P is the relation of "being a friend of" then R ⊕ P is
the relation "behaving kindly with everyone except the friends of")
• The relation of inclusion R ≤ P is R + P = P
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• The Boolean unit 1 is 1̊ + 1̊−, and has standard meaning of a relation that
always holds.
• The Boolean zero 0 is 1− or (̊1 + 1̊−)−, and has standard meaning of a relation
that never holds.
• The diversity element or Peircean zero 0̊ is 1̊−, and has standard meaning of a
relation that holds between two elements only if the two elements are different.
Then we have some conditions, that can be seen as axioms schemata, that have to
be satisfied. The first 3 conditions express the fact that our addition and comple-
mentation operators are the same as in a Boolean algebra:
R + P =̊P +R (A1)
R + (P + S)=̊(P +R) + S (A2)
(R− + P )− + (R− + P−)−=̊R (A3)
Them the second group of conditions say that an interpretation of the Peircean
multiplication is a semigroup operation and the interpretation of the identity is an
identity element with respect to the Peircean multiplication:
R (P  S)=̊(P R) S (A4)
R 1̊=̊R (A5)
The third group of conditions say that an interpretation of the converse operator is
an involution with respect to the semigroup operation:
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R``=̊R (A6)
(R P )`=̊P` R` (A7)
And the fourth group says that the interpretations of the Peircean multiplication
and converse operators distribute across addition:
(P +R) S=̊(P  S) + (R S) (A8)
(R + P )`=̊R` + P` (A9)
The final condition is due to Tarski, it is a simplification of a set of equivalence
results of De Morgan, put into a single equational form:
(R`  (R P )−) + P−=̊P− (A10)
with the original de Morgan equivalences being:
R P ≤ S− iff R`  S ≤ P− iff S  P` ≤ R−
With the standard interpretation of R ≤ P iff R + P = P .
Yet this formalization of relation algebra emerged only in a second moment, with the
original article by Tarski first describing the operations between relations as axioms
of a FOL theory, and then deducing the rules that we have just seen as theorems of
this theory. We will focus on the following FOL description, as it is easier to derive
a sequent calculi from a FOL theory.
We augment our FOL language with new relation variables, R, S, T, ... . Then from
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the symbols for the relational constants and operations described earlier (+,−,,`
, ·,⊕, 1̊, 0̊, 1, 0) and a special relation equality symbol =, we augment the relational
variables: we combine relation constants and relation variables with a single unary
relation operation symbol, or we join two of them with a binary operation symbol,
and so on. So we form compounds such as 1−, R−, R−P , R−P + 1−, etc. Then
we also add any expression of the form xRy with x, y individual variables and R a




∀x∀y∀z (xRy ∧ ẙ1z)→ xRz (T4)
∀x∀y x̊0y ⇐⇒ ¬x̊1y (T5)
∀x∀y xR−y ⇐⇒ ¬xRy (T6)
∀x∀y xR`y ⇐⇒ yRx (T7)
∀x∀y xR + Py ⇐⇒ xRy ∨ xPy (T8)
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∀x∀y xR · Py ⇐⇒ xRy ∧ xPy (T9)
∀x∀y xR⊕ Py ⇐⇒ ∀z(xRz ∨ zPy) (T10)
∀x∀y xR Py ⇐⇒ ∃z(xRz ∧ zPy) (T11)
R=̊P ⇐⇒ ∀x∀y(xRy ⇐⇒ xPy) (T12)
All of these axioms can be turned into sequent calculi rules with the procedure
defined previously, by converting them first into geometric axioms.
4.1.2 Geometric axioms for RA
The axioms of Tarski can easily be converted to geometric axioms, then in the next
section we will use these geometric axioms to get to a sequent calculus for relation
algebras.
The axiom T1 is easily converted into the geometric counterpart using verum ad
quodlibet :
∀x∀y > → x1y (GT1)
T2 is similarly simple:
∀x∀y x0y → ⊥ (GT2)
T3 is the same as T1:
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∀x> → x̊1x (GT3)
T4 is already geometric:
∀x∀y∀z (xRy ∧ ẙ1z)→ xRz (GT4)
With T5 (∀x∀y x̊0y ⇐⇒ ¬x̊1y)we start to be more careful. Given the biconditional
we can split it in into two axioms T5.1 (∀x∀y x̊0y → ¬x̊1y)and T5.2 (∀x∀y ¬x̊1y →
x̊0y). T5.1 can be transformed using logical equivalences into ∀x∀y ¬(x̊0y ∧ x̊1y),
which is geometric:
∀x∀y (x̊0y ∧ x̊1y)→ ⊥ (GT5.1)
T5.2 is easily transformed into ∀x∀y x̊1 ∨ x̊0y, which is:
∀x∀y > → y x̊1y ∨ x̊0y (GT5.2)
For T6 (∀x∀y xR−y ⇐⇒ ¬xRy) we follow the exact same reasoning:
∀x∀y (xR−y ∧ xRy)→ ⊥ (GT6.1)
∀x∀y > → xRy ∨ xR−y (GT6.2)
for T7 (∀x∀y xR`y ⇐⇒ yRx), we split it into two geometric axioms:
∀x∀y xR`y → yRx (GT7.1)
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∀x∀y yRx→ xR`y (GT7.2)
For T8 (∀x∀y xR+Py ⇐⇒ xRy ∨ xPy) we split it as usual into T8.1 (∀x∀y xR+
Py → xRy ∨ xPy), which is geometric, and T8.2 (∀x∀y (xRy ∨ xPy)→ xR+ Py).
For T8.2 we can use the equivalence (A ∨ B) → C ⇐⇒ (A → C) ∧ (B → C) to
get T8.2.1 ∀x∀y xRy → xR + Py) and T8.2.2 ∀x∀y xPy → xR + Py). This leads
us to the geometric axioms:
∀x∀y xR + Py → xRy ∨ xPy (GT8.1)
∀x∀y xRy → xR + Py (GT8.2.1)
∀x∀y xPy → xR + Py (GT8.2.2)
For T9 we are immediately done:
∀x∀y xR · Py → xRy ∧ xPy (GT9.1)
∀x∀y xRy ∧ xPy → xR · Py (GT9.2)
For T10 (∀x∀y xR ⊕ Py ⇐⇒ ∀z(xRz ∨ zPy))we have to be more careful. We
first split it into T10.1: ∀x∀y xR ⊕ Py → ∀z(xRz ∨ zPy), which is geometric after
moving out the quantifier, and T10.2: ∀x∀y ∀z(xRz ∨ zPy) → xR ⊕ Py. After
some logical equivalences, we get T10.2: ∀x∀y∃z (¬xRz ∧¬zPy)∨ xR⊕ Py, which
we can make geometric if we can get rid of the negations. So we have T10.2.1
: ∀x∀y∃z (xR′z ∧ zP ′y) ∨ xR ⊕ Py and T10.2.2: ∀x∀z xR′z → ¬xRz, which is
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∀x∀z xR′z ∧ xRz → ⊥, and T10.2.3: ∀x∀z xP ′z ∧ xPz → ⊥. This gives us the
geometric axioms:
∀x∀y∀z xR⊕ Py → (xRz ∨ zPy) (GT10.1)
∀x∀y > → ∃z((xR′z ∧ zP ′y) ∨ xR⊕ Py) (GT10.2.1)
∀x∀z xR′z ∧ xRz → ⊥ (GT10.2.2)
∀x∀z xP ′z ∧ xPz → ⊥ (GT10.2.3)
For T11 (∀x∀yxRPy ⇐⇒ ∃z(xRz∧zPy)) we have it split into T11.1 ∀x∀yxR
Py → ∃z(xRz ∧ zPy) and T11.2 ∀x∀y∀z (xRz ∧ zPy) → xR  Py, which are
geometric:
∀x∀y xR Py → ∃z(xRz ∧ zPy) (GT11.1)
∀x∀y∀z (xRz ∧ zPy)→ xR Py (GT11.2)
For T12 (R=̊P ⇐⇒ ∀x∀y(xRy ⇐⇒ xPy)) we have to first split it into T12.1:
R=̊P → ∀x∀y(xRy ⇐⇒ xPy) and T12.2: (∀x∀y(xRy ⇐⇒ xPy))→ R=̊P . Then
T12.1 is equivalent to : ∀x∀y R=̊P → ((¬xRy ∧ ¬xPy) ∨ (xRy ∧ xPy)), which we
can make geometric by introducing new relations: T12.1.1 is ∀x∀yR=̊P → ((xR′y∧
xP ′y) ∨ (xRy ∧ xPy)), T12.1.2 is ∀x∀y xR′y → ¬xRy and T12.1.3 is ∀x∀y xP ′y →
¬xPy, but these last two axioms we already have (up to renaming). For T12.2 we
can rewrite it as: ∃x∃y ¬(xRy ⇐⇒ xPy)∨R=̊P which is ∃x∃y ¬((¬xRy ∨xPy)∧
(¬xPy ∨ xRy))∨R=̊P , which is ∃x∃y ((xRy ∧¬xPy)∨ (xPy ∧¬xRy))∨R=̊P , for
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which we use the renaming trick again, and it becomes T12.2.1: ∃x∃y((xRy∧xP ′y)∨
(xPy ∧ xR′y)) ∨R=̊P and T12.2.2:∀x∀y xR′y → ¬xRy and T12.2.3: ∀x∀y xP ′y →
¬xPy, but again these last two axioms we already have. So for this last axioms we
have:
∀x∀y R=̊P → ((xR′y ∧ xP ′y) ∨ (xRy ∧ xPy)) (GT12.1.1)
> → ∃x∃y ((xRy ∧ xP ′y) ∨ (xPy ∧ xR′y)) ∨R=̊P (GT12.2.1)
4.1.3 A sequent calculus for RA
Now that we have the geometric version of the axioms we are ready to present a
sequent calculus for relation algebras. If we transform GT1 to a rule, we would get
the rule that introduces the "1" relation, and we would get:
>, x1y,Γ⇒ ∆
1>,Γ ⇒ ∆
Now to deal with this rule and the following ones that contain a > symbol, we would




But to avoid unnecessary complications we will take out the > symbol from all the




The GT2 axiom will corresponds to the impossibility of the "0" relation:
0
x0y,Γ ⇒ ∆
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GT3 is the axiom that introduces the 1̊ relation:
x̊1x,Γ⇒ ∆
I̊1Γ ⇒ ∆
GT4 is a sort of identity rule for the 1̊, that states:
xRy, ẙ1z, xRzΓ⇒ ∆
E̊1
xRy, ẙ1z,Γ ⇒ ∆
GT5.1 and GT5.2 specify the behaviour of 0̊, with one being an axiomatic rule and
another being an introduction:
Ax̊0
x̊1y, x̊0y,Γ ⇒ ∆
x̊1y,Γ ⇒ ∆ x̊0y,Γ ⇒ ∆
I̊0Γ ⇒ ∆
GT6.1 and GT6.2 deal with R−, similarly to the previous rules:
AxR−
xR−y, xRy,Γ ⇒ ∆
xRy,Γ ⇒ ∆ xR−y,Γ ⇒ ∆
IR−Γ ⇒ ∆
GT7.1 and GT7.2 specify R`, saying that you can always get the converse of a
relation:
yRx, xR`y,Γ ⇒ ∆
I1R`yRx,Γ ⇒ ∆
xR`y, yRx,Γ ⇒ ∆
I2R`
xR`y,Γ ⇒ ∆
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GT8 specifies how R + P acts, with the first rule GT8.1 "eliminating" the +, and
GT8.2.1 and GT8.2.2 being equal up to renaming, and "introducing" the +:
xR + Py, xRy,Γ ⇒ ∆ xR + Py, xPy,Γ ⇒ ∆
E+
xR + Py,Γ ⇒ ∆
xRy, xR + Py,Γ ⇒ ∆
I+
xRy,Γ ⇒ ∆
GT9.1 similarly eliminates the ·, while GT9.2 introduces it:
xR · Py, xRy, xPy,Γ ⇒ ∆
E·
xR · Py,Γ ⇒ ∆
xRy, xPy, xR · Py,Γ ⇒ ∆
I·
xRy, xPy,Γ ⇒ ∆
Given the meaning of + and ·, we notice how their rules look a bit similar to the
rules for ∧ and ∨.
GT10.1 deals with how to eliminate R⊕P , while GT10.2.1 is a sort of introduction.
GT10.2.2 and GT10.2.3 are the same up to renaming, and are used as axiomatic
rules:
xR⊕ Py, xRz,Γ ⇒ ∆ xR⊕ Py, zPy,Γ ⇒ ∆
E⊕
xR⊕ Py,Γ ⇒ ∆




xRy, xR′y,Γ ⇒ ∆
GT11.1 eliminates the  while GT11.2 introduces it:
xR Py, xRz, zPy,Γ ⇒ ∆
E
xR Py,Γ ⇒ ∆
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(and z is not free in the conclusions)
xRz, zPy, xR Py,Γ ⇒ ∆
I
xRz, zPy,Γ ⇒ ∆
GT12 is important because it tells us how to deal with equations between relations.
GT12.1.1 is a sort of elimination while GT12.2.1 is a sort of introduction.
R=̊P, xR′y, xP ′y,Γ ⇒ ∆ R=̊P, xRy, xPyΓ ⇒ ∆
E=̊
R=̊P,Γ ⇒ ∆
R=̊P,Γ ⇒ ∆ R=̊P, xRy, xP ′yΓ ⇒ ∆ R=̊P, xR′y, xPyΓ ⇒ ∆
E=̊
Γ ⇒ ∆
4.2 Example of use
To give some intuitions about the us of the calculus, suppose we want to prove the
obvious equivalence R−−=̊R, we have:
Ax
R−−=̊R,Γ⇒ R−−=̊R xRy, xR−−′y ⇒ R−−=̊R xR−−y, xR′y ⇒ R−−=̊R
E=̊⇒ R−−=̊R
The first sequent is an axiom by a rule of FOL sequent calculi. For the rest of the
sequents in the antecedent we notice that a formula of the type A′ is tractable by
only AxR′. So if we consider the middle sequent, we conclude that we have to find
a way to transform the xRy into an xR−−y, so that we can use the last one in
conjunction with the xR−−′y to use the AxR′ rule. So we prove the middle sequent
by:
AxR−
xRy,R−−′, xR−y, ⇒ ∆ AxR
′
xRy,R−−′, xR−−y ⇒ ∆
IR−
xRy,R−−′ ⇒ R−−=̊R
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Where the first sequent is an axiom by AxR− and indeed the second is an axiom by
AxR′. For the sequent on the right R−−, xR′yR−−=̊R the proof is similar.
We notice we have to use a bit of creativity in the proof, but we are still limited in
what we can use. This limit comes from the rules of the sequent calculus: indeed
one could say that we have obtained some rules of the form
A,Γ ⇒ ∆ B,Γ ⇒ ∆
Γ ⇒ ∆
where one is free to chose what relations to chose for A,B. Yet in searching for a
proof of R=̊P we will always be limited by the necessity to reconstruct R from P
and vice-versa, so to use the AxR′ rule. This makes the possible rules to use limited
to the relation operations in R,P . And for the same reasons also the possible
instantiations of A,B from our rules will be limited to the subterms of R,P .
4.3 Simplifying the calculus
We could argue that the calculus we obtained is overburdened by rules, so in this
section we will quickly try to reduced the number of rules needed.
One of the first things to notice is that the addition of the =̊ symbol, while clearly
necessary in a FOL domain to distinguish between different meanings of equality,
in the calculus plays a very limited role. Indeed if the only sequents that are to
be proved are of the form ⇒ R=̊P , then we might as well omit any rule for the
=̊ and instead accept that we are always proving equivalent sequents of the form
⇒ ∀x∀y ((xRy → xPy) ∧ (xPy → xRy)). This means that for any R,P we would
always have a proof starting like this:
xPy ⇒ xRy →
⇒ xPy → xRy
xRy ⇒ xPy →
⇒ xRy → xPy ∀,∧
⇒ ∀x∀y ((xRy → xPy) ∧ (xPy → xRy))
This leads to observe that to prove ⇒ R=̊P , what we want is to prove R ⇒ P
and P ⇒ R (this can be seen informally as proving two subset inclusions). This is
4.3. Simplifying the calculus 55
interesting because by inspecting our rules for the relations calculus we notice that
all our rules are modifying the left part of a sequent. This leads to the conclusion
that one possible strategy for proving a sequent of the form R ⇒ P will be to use
the relation calculus rules we derived to construct P from R, to obtain a sequent
P ⇒ P that we can close by using the Ax rule from the G3c calculus.
Furthermore we can simplify the calculus even more by noticing that the famous
equivalences R · P =̊(R− + P−)−, R ⊕ P =̊(R−  P−)−, 1=̊̊1 + 1̊−, 0=̊(̊1 + 1̊−)−,
0̊=̊̊1−, hold in our calculus. As an example we prove the first one, by first proving
xR · Py ⇒ (R− + P−)−:
Ax
..., xRy, xPy, x(R− + P−)−y ⇒ (R− + P−)−
..., xRy, xR−y ⇒ (R− + P−)− ..., xPy, xP−y ⇒ (R− + P−)−
E+
..., xRy, xPy, x(R− + P−)y ⇒ (R− + P−)−
IR−
..., xRy, xPy ⇒ (R− + P−)−
E·
xR · Py ⇒ (R− + P−)−
And then proving (R− + P−)− ⇒ xR · Py:
AxR−
(R− + P−)−, xR−y, xR− + P−y ⇒ xR · Py
I+
(R− + P−)−, xR−y ⇒ xR · Py
..., xR · Py ⇒ xR · Py
I·
(R− + P−)−, xRy, xPy ⇒ xR · Py
..., (R− + P−)−, (R− + P−) ⇒ xR · Py
I+
(R− + P−)−, xRy, xP−y ⇒ xR · Py
E+
(R− + P−)−, xRy ⇒ xR · Py
IR−
(R− + P−)− ⇒ xR · Py
This leads us to the conclusion that we can drop all the rules related to the ⊕, ·, 1, 0, 0̊
operations. Now we can finally define our sequent calculus for relation algebras,
which we will call SeRA. SeRA will be composed by all the rules from G3c (although
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xRy, ẙ1z, xRz,Γ⇒ ∆
E̊1
xRy, ẙ1z,Γ ⇒ ∆
AxR−
xR−y, xRy,Γ ⇒ ∆
xRy,Γ ⇒ ∆ xR−y,Γ ⇒ ∆
IR−Γ ⇒ ∆
yRx, xR`y,Γ ⇒ ∆
I1R`yRx,Γ ⇒ ∆
xR`y, yRx,Γ ⇒ ∆
I2R`
xR`y,Γ ⇒ ∆
xR + Py, xRy,Γ ⇒ ∆ xR + Py, xPy,Γ ⇒ ∆
E+
xR + Py,Γ ⇒ ∆
xRy, xR + Py,Γ ⇒ ∆
I+
xRy,Γ ⇒ ∆
xR Py, xRz, zPy,Γ ⇒ ∆
E
xR Py,Γ ⇒ ∆
(and z is not free in the conclusions)
xRz, zPy, xR Py,Γ ⇒ ∆
I
xRz, zPy,Γ ⇒ ∆
4.4 A comparison with the Maddux sequent calcu-
lus of relation algebras
Historically this is not the first sequent calculus developed for the calculus of relations[5].
In 1983 Roger Maddux developed a sequent calculus, which we will call MaRA, in
which a sequent P ⇒ R had the interpretation of P ⊆ R, and was characterized by
the following rules:
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MAx













Γ, xRy ⇒ ∆
MR-
Γ ⇒ xR−y,∆
Γ, yRx ⇒ ∆ ML`
Γ, xR`y ⇒ ∆
Γ ⇒ yRx∆ MR`
Γ ⇒ xR`y,∆
xRy,Γ ⇒ ∆ xPy,Γ ⇒ ∆
ML+
xR + Py,Γ ⇒ ∆
Γ ⇒ xRy, xPy,∆
MR+
Γ ⇒ xR + Py,∆
xRy, xPy,Γ ⇒ ∆
ML·
xR · Py,Γ ⇒ ∆
Γ ⇒ xRy,∆ Γ ⇒ xPy,∆
MR·
Γ ⇒ xR · Py,∆
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xRz, zPy,Γ ⇒ ∆
ML
xR Py,Γ ⇒ ∆
with z not appearing in the conclusion of the ML
Γ ⇒ xRz,∆ Γ ⇒ zPy,∆
MR
Γ ⇒ xR Py,∆
plus the rules for cut elimination, weakening and contraction.
Maddux used this calculus to successfully find a new proof for the older results of
Tarski that a FOL sentence with no more than three variables can be translated into
an equation in the calculus of relations. And furthermore Maddux was also able to
find an algebraic semantics for this calculus.
We first prove that our calculus and MaRA are equivalent if we allow the cut rule
in SeRA. To do so we employ a proof strategy based on showing how the rules of a
calculus are derivable in another one.
Definition 4.4.1. We say that a calculus A is able to simulate a calculus B when
any rule R of B is admissible in A, that is, when the conclusion of R is derivable
in A, if the premises of A are derivable in A.
Theorem 4.4.1. SeRA can simulate MaRA. Furthermore MaRA can simulate the
non-logical part of SeRA.
Proof. We prove that we can simulate all the rules of MaRA using SeRA+Cut.
MAx is the same as in our calculus. M0 as well.




M1 is similar. Mid is immediate with our rule E̊1.
For ML- we have to use a cut:
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⇒ xRy AxR-xR−y, xRy ⇒
cut
xR−y ⇒




xR−y ⇒ xR−y xRy ⇒ xR−y
R-⇒ xR−y
with the first being an axiom and the second being a premise in MR-.
For ML` is the same as in our calculus. for MR`:
⇒ yRx AxR-xR−y, yRx ⇒ xR`y
cut
⇒ xR`y
With the first being a premise from Maddux and the second our axiom AxR-.
For ML+ is the same as in our calculus. For MR+:
⇒ xRy, xPy
R∨⇒ xRy ∨ xPy
Ax
xRy, xR + Py ⇒ xR + Py
I+
xRy ⇒ xR + Py
Ax
xPy, xR + Py ⇒ xR + Py
I+
xPy ⇒ xR + Py
L∨
xRy ∨ xPy ⇒ xR + Py
cut⇒ xR + Py
With the first premise being one of the premises of Maddux.
For ML· is the same as in our calculus, for MR·:
⇒ xRy ⇒ xPy
R∧⇒ xRy ∧ xPy
Ax
xRy, xPy, xR · Py ⇒ xR · Py
I·
xRy, xPy ⇒ xR · Py
L∧
xRy ∧ xPy ⇒ xR · Py
cut⇒ xR · Py
For ML is easy, for MR is similar to above:
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⇒ xRy ⇒ xPy
R∧⇒ xRy ∧ xPy
Ax
xRy, xPy, xR Py ⇒ xR Py
I
xRy, xPy ⇒ xR Py
L∧
xRy ∧ xPy ⇒ xR Py
cut⇒ xR Py
This concludes the first part of the proof. Now we prove that MaRA can simulate
the non-logical part of SeRA.
To simulate I̊1 we use a cut:
M1̊
Γ ⇒ ∆, x̊1x Γ, x̊1x ⇒ ∆
cut
Γ ⇒ ∆
with the second premise of the cut being a premise of I̊1.
For E̊1 is the same as in MaRA.







MR-⇒ xR−y xR−y ⇒
cut⇒
With all the premises being our premises in IR-
For I1R`:
Ax






For I2R` is the same.
For E+ is the same as in the calculus of Maddux. For I+:
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Ax
xRy ⇒ xRy, xPy
MR+
xRy ⇒ xR + Py xRy, xR + Py ⇒
cut
xRy ⇒
With the right premise of the cut being a premise in I+.
E is the same as in our calculus, while I:
Ax
xRz, zPy ⇒ zPy AxxRz, zPy ⇒ xRz
MR
xRz, zPy ⇒ xR Py xRz, zPy, xR Py ⇒
cut
xRz, zPy ⇒
With this we conclude the proof.
With this theorem we can claim that SeRA has the same expressiveness of the other
main calculus in the literature of relation algebra. But we can go a step further
given that our calculus is cut-free. Indeed Maddux proved that MaRA has some
shortcomings in terms of its cut-elimination rule. That is, there exist some particular
equivalences that can only be proved by the MaRA calculus through a derivation
that used a cut rule.
For example, one such derivation is x(R  1)  1y ⇒ xR  1y. Yet clearly in our
calculus this result is obtained by a cut-free derivation:
Ax
..., xRz′, z′1z, z1y, z′1y, xR 1y ⇒ xR 1y
I
..., xRz′, z′1z, z1y, z′1y ⇒ xR 1y
1
..., xRz′, z′1z, z1y ⇒ xR 1y
E
..., x(R 1)z, z1y ⇒ xR 1y
E
x(R 1) 1y ⇒ xR 1y
Indeed we will always be able to deduce a cut-free proof in our sequent calculus.
Thanks to our previous result that sequent calculi of geometric theories are cut-free
we are able to immediately deduce:
Theorem 4.4.2. If SeRA+Cut ` Γ⇒ ∆ then SeRA ` Γ⇒ ∆
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Yet in our proof of x(R 1) 1y ⇒ xR 1y we can notice that we are introducing
a z′1y at a certain point, that is quite "creative" in its use, as we are instantiating
a relation between variables that didn’t appear before in the proof. This makes
our calculus a bit troubling to use if we want a totally deterministic calculation
unfolding from the sequent to be proved.
One possible objection to this is that sequent calculi that are cut-free are easy to
inspect to determine if there some decidable fragments of the theory. That is, by
looking at the sequent calculi rules for the theory, we can sometimes make some
observations that lead us to a proof of decidability. As an example of this, one
easy result that we can obtain is that if in a sequent A ⇒ B the only operations
appearing are the symbols for + and `, then there is an algorithm that can decide
if the sequent A⇒ B holds or not.
Theorem 4.4.3. Let A,B be two relations, formed by some relations R1, ...Rn, and
with the only symbols appearing in them being + and `. Then xAy ⇒ xBy is
decidable.
Proof. The first thing we notice is that in a derivation of xAy ⇒ xBy with only
+ and ` appearing we will have the subterm property. That is, in a proof of
xAy ⇒ xBy, we will have only the variables x, y appear, and the relations appearing
will be only among A,B and the sub-relations in them.
This is because there is no rule to introduce other variables except x, y (indeed
we cannot use the only rule that introduces new variables, E because the only
symbols appearing are + and `). Likewise for the relations, we notice that given
our assumptions the only way to close a branch of a sequent proof is through the
Ax rule, that is through recreating a sequent ..., xBy ⇒ xBy. Clearly that xBy will
not have any new relations, and by inspecting our rules we can also be sure we don’t
need any new relations to construct it that is not already in B (this is because there
isn’t any rule that has in its conclusion a relation symbol that is totally eliminated
in its premises).
Thanks to the subterm property we can get a decidable algorithm. If xAy ⇒ xBy
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is provable, with a finite number of relations R1, ...Rn to instantiate with a finite
number of rules, we are guaranteed to eventually reconstruct the relation xBy from
xAy. If xAy ⇒ xBy is not provable, then there si no such reconstruction, so we can
stop when we start to instantiate relations we already have in a previous step.
Even if such result might not appear that interesting, the point to note is that is
possible to get such results by only inspecting the calculus. So the method presented
of extending the sequent calculus with rules for a mathematical theory has the added
benefit of providing new methods for proving results about that theory.
On the other hand, looking back at relations algebras, one might ask which other
decidability results we could find. One easy answer is that also for sequents only
containing + and − we have decidability, but this is because of results coming from
the decidability of Boolean algebras. Another observation stemming from the same
line of thought is that the full theory of RA was proved[23]to be able to express
a fragment of FOL capable of expressing Peano arithmetic. Thus from the well
know undecidability of Peano arithmetic we conclude the undecidability of RA, and
consequently of our calculus.
4.5 Conclusions
In this thesis we wanted to present some of the current developments in proof the-
ory, specifically how to create cut-free sequent calculi for a given theory. After a
brief historical introduction about proof theory, in the first chapter we focused on
explaining the basics of sequent calculi. We explained how to obtain some rules
for propositional, intuitionistic, and first-order logic. Furthermore we gave some
intuitions about what makes a "good" calculus and introduced the cut elimination
rule.
The second chapter was devoted to obtain a technique capable of extending the
sequent calculus for FOL to a sequent calculus for a theory axiomatized in FOL.
Specifically we saw how to obtain rules from geometric axioms, and how these rules
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still preserve the cut-elimination theorem. At the end we gave an application of this
technique, and presented an intuitive exposition of Barr’s theorem.
The third chapter presented a brief digression about how to use Skolem extensions
to get a geometric theory out of any theory. In this way the results from the second
chapter are applicable to an even broader range of theories.
Finally in the fourth chapter we gave a concrete application of these methods for
the well-known theory of the calculus of relations. We obtained some rules from the
axioms originally used by Tarski, and then we simplified them in a more compact
and usable form. At the end we found that our calculus, being cut-free, compares
favourably with the other sequent calculus found in the literature.
We hope that in this work we have achieved a compact but thorough exposition of
these themes. Likewise we think that the work presented here holds some importance
at multiple levels. For example, the technique that allows us to obtain a cut-free
sequent-calculi out of a geometrical theory allows us to derive a quick proof of
Barr’s theorem. This is to testify that the method is not a mathematical island, but
can be connected with previous work from a different field. Even more we have a
constructive proof that the sequent calculi obtained by the method are cut-free. By
using the method we are able to obtain a sequent calculus for many theories, which
might not have had a cut-free calculus before. In particular, we applied the method
to the field of the calculus of relations, a powerful theory with a rich history, and
many current applications in computer science[25]. And by doing so we were the
first to obtain a cut-free calculus for this theory.
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